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A JUDICIAL PERSPECTIVE ON
OPINION EVIDENCE UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES
GEORGE C. PRATT*
I. Introduction
The purpose of this article is to focus upon some practical aspects of
opinion evidence under the Federal Rules of Evidence. The issues, sug-
gestions, and problems posed are largely intuitive, and are derived
primarily from trial experience. Implicit in the discussion are one major
premise and two minor premises. The major premise is that Article VII
of the Federal Rules of Evidence represents a realistic, practical, and
desirable approach to the problems associated with opinion testimony.
The two minor premises arise from application of Article VII in prac-
tice and relate to the role of attorneys and trial judges in achieving the
maximum benefits from Article VII. First, because Article VII's ap-
proach to opinion testimony relies heavily on the adversary system,
special burdens are placed on the advocates. Thus, attorneys have fruit-
ful opportunities available to them in presenting opinion testimony, and
attorneys seeking to counter such testimony must in pretrial proceed-
ings carefully discover the expert's opinion and its underlying basis in
order to undercut that evidence at trial. Second, appellate courts almost
universally regard a trial court's rulings in admitting or excluding opi-
nion testimony as discretionary and seldom reverse those rulings.1
Therefore, the trial judge, to achieve a just result, should make every ef-
fort to insure that counsel fairly present opinion testimony and the jury
carefully evaluates it.2
Article VII of the Federal Rules of Evidence is concise;3 its opinion
* Judge, United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York; Adjunct
Professor, St. John's University Law School; Distinguished Visiting Professor, Hofstra
University Law School. B.A. 1950, Yale University; LL.B. 1953, Yale School of Law. The
subject of this article originally was presented at the Washington and Lee School of Law in
a colloqium sponsored by the Francis Lewis Law Center. The author would like to express
his appreciation to his law clerk, Dolores Fredrich, Esq., for her assistance in preparing
this article.
I E.g., Randolph v. Collectramatic, Inc., 590 F.2d 844, 847 (10th Cir. 1979); United
States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194, 1197-98 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1117 (1979); United
States v. Johnson, 575 F.2d 1347, 1360 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 907 (1979); United
States v. Cyphers, 553 F.2d 1064, 1072 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 843 (1977); United
States v. Brown, 540 F.2d 1048, 1053 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1100 (1977). Cf.
Knight v. Otis Elevator Co., 596 F.2d 84, 86-87 (3d Cir. 1979); United States v. Garvin, 565
F.2d 519, 522 (8th Cir. 1977). Knight and Garvin cite the general rule, but find abuses of the
trial courts' discretion under the circumstances of the cases.
Of course, in a non-jury case, the court must carefully make its own evaluation.
See notes 6, 13, 14, 25 & 30 infra. Rule 706, relating to court-appointed experts, is
outside the scope of this article and is not discussed.
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rules appear to be simple and direct. With little discussion, Congress
adopted the opinion rules in nearly the same form as the advisory com-
mittee proposed.4 Such easy acceptance is perhaps understandable since
the rules reflect an enlightened, academic view of opinion testimony that
dates back some fifty years.' The lack of discussion is somewhat surpris-
ing, however, when one considers the persistence, frequency, and suc-
cess of attorneys' objections to opinion testimony since the adoption of
the Rules, objections made on the very grounds that Article VII sought
to undercut.
II. The Opinion Rules
A. Rule 701
Rule 701 permits a lay witness to testify to an opinion or inference
that is rationally based on his perception and helpful either to a clear
understanding of his testimony or to the determination of a fact in issue.'
As Dean Wigmore pointed out, the rule prohibiting lay witnesses from
giving opinions is a phenomenon peculiar to American jurisprudence.'
While English courts condemned testimony consisting of "opinion," they
used the term to refer only to a statement not made on the basis of the
witness' personal knowledge.' American courts, however, expanded the
English courts' concept of opinion testimony and sought to limit a lay
witness' testimony to "facts," while excluding his "opinions," "conclu-
sions," and "inferences." 9 This stricter American approach to lay opi-
nions has proven to be logically unsound and impossible to apply in prac-
tice."
Under Rule 701, witnesses may testify in terms used in everyday
speech. Witnesses who testify in the courtroom, unless carefully coached
in advance, frequently try to express themselves using the phrases "I
' See Notes of Advisory Committee on Proposed Rules, reprinted in FED. R. Evm.,
Rules 701-706, 28 U.S.C. Appendix 570-73 (1976).
' See generally 7 J. WTGMORE, EVIDENCE, § 1917 (3d Ed. 1940) [hereinafter cited as
WIGMORE]; C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE, § 11 (1954) [hereinafter cited as MCCORMICK]; 3 J. WEIN-
STEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 701[011 (1981) [hereinafter cited as WEINSTEIN
& BERGER].
6 FED. R. EVID 701, Opinion Testimony by Lay Witness, provides:
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, his testimony in the form of opinions
or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally bas-
ed on the perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a clear understanding of his
testimony or the determination of a fact in issue.
7 WIGMORE, supra note 5, § 1917.
'See id. §§ 1917-29; Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert
Testimony, 15 HARV, L. REV. 40, 44-45 (1901).
Hardy v. Merrill, 56 N.H. 227, 241 (1875); Sydleman v. Beckwith, 43 Conn. 9, 12
(1875); Cooper v. State, 23 Tex. 331, 337-39 (1859); Evans v. People, 12 Mich. 27, 35 (1863); see
7 WIGMORE, supra note 5, § 1918.
" See, e.g., MCCORMICK, supra note 5, § 12.
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think," "I believe," "my impression was," or "in my opinion." In New
York, where state courts tenaciously adhere to the old "opinion rule,"" a
witness' answer prefaced by any of the foregoing almost automatically
provokes a "knee-jerk" objection on the ground that "it calls for the
operation of the witness' mind." Too often the objection is sustained. A
carefully prepared witness, of course, would express the same thought
in the permissible form: "to the best of my recollection." By permitting
testimony "in the form of" opinions or inferences, Rule 701 recognizes
that much of the courtroom conflict over a lay witness' opinion testi-
mony is merely argument over form.
There are two prerequisites to the admissibility of a lay opinion. The
first requires that the lay witness' testimony be "rationally based on the
perception of the witness." Unlike an expert witness, who may assume
facts to be true, the opinions or inferences of a lay witness must arise
from her own perception. The second prerequisite requires the witness'
opinion to be helpful either to a clear understanding of the witness'
testimony or to the determination of a fact in issue. This limitation of
Rule 701 is nothing more than a special adaptation of Rule 403, which
permits exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of prejudice, confu-
sion, or waste of time.'2 Thus, if a witness' opinion, even when based on
her perception, does no more than draw an inference from facts readily
expressed from the witness stand, it is not truly "helpful" and,
therefore, may be excluded as a "waste of time." In practice, however, a
lay witness' own opinion or evaluation of the facts to which she testifies
is usually apparent from her testimony. It is frequently quicker and less
confusing to permit the witness to express such an opinion than to hear
argument upon an objection, a process that always engenders confusion
in the minds of the jury. Thus, permitting such an opinion is usually not
only harmless but also a timesaver.
There is a further advantage to relatively free admission of lay opin-
ions. Unlike many experts, lay witnesses frequently lack experience in
testifying. They tend to become flustered when their usual manner of ex-
pression proves unacceptable to the presiding judge. Testifying is dif-
ficult enough without needless, artificial barriers. A witness who is
upset because she is made self-conscious about her speech patterns will
often prove to be less persuasive. By eliminating the artificial rule that
prevented lay witnesses from expressing themselves in opinion form,
Rule 701 has made it easier for them to express themselves and to com-
See generally Fisch, Lay Opinions in New York, 37 CORNELL L. REv. 32 (1951).
12 FED. R. Evm. 403 provides:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantial-
ly outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
See generally Dolan, Rule 403: The Prejudice Rule in Evidence, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 220
(1976).
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municate effectively with counsel. In so doing, Rule 701 has advanced
the truth-finding function of trials.
B. Rules 702 and 703
Rules 702 and 703 set forth prerequisites for admitting expert opi-
nions. Under Rule 702, a person who is "qualified as an expert" may give
opinion testimony."3 Her qualifications must come from "knowledge,
skill, experience, training or education," and she is permitted to testify
to scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge that will assist the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.
Under Rule 703, an expert may base her opinion upon facts or data
perceived by or made known to her either at or before the hearing."
Those facts or data need not be admissible in evidence provided that
they are of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular
field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject.
A comparison of the requirements for lay opinions with those for ex-
pert opinions is revealing. While Rule 701 limits a lay witness' opinion
testimony to opinions rationally based on the witness' perception, Rule
703 permits an expert to base her opinions upon "facts or data" perceiv-
ed by her, or made known to her either at or before her testimony. This
broad language encompasses everything that the expert may know, not
only in general, but about the particular case. Most significantly, the ex-
pert may rely on facts or data which are inadmissible evidence, provided
that they are of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the field.
Both lay and expert witnesses may testify to an opinion that will aid
in "determination of a fact in issue." An alternative condition permits an
opinion from a lay witness when it is helpful to a clear understanding of
"his testimony," and from an expert when it will assist the trier of fact
to understand "the evidence," which includes not only the expert's
testimony, but any other evidence that may be presented.
Thus, Rules 702 and 703 permit a wide range of expert testimony.
While prior case law frequently limited expert testimony to subject
areas in which the witness was engaged as a profession, trade, or
calling,'5 the Federal Rules now permit such testimony wherever special-
" FED. R. EVID. 702, Testimony by Experts, provides:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto
in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
11 FED. R. EVID. 703, Bases of Opinion Testimony by Experts, provides:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or
inference may be those perceived by or made known to him at or before the hear-
ing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in form-
ing opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissi-
ble in evidence.
" 7 WIGMORE, supra note 5, § 1923.
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ized knowledge will assist the trier of fact. To qualify as an expert, the
witness need not be a certified academic, but is required merely to have
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education.
Some judges have been heard informally to express the test for ex-
pertise in terms of whether the witness knows more about the subject
than the court or jury. Since Rule 702 permits expert testimony if the
witness possesses specialized knowledge that will assist the trier of fact,
the rules potentially make virtually every person an expert in some
field. Nearly every activity in which people engage involves specialized
knowledge of one degree or another. For example, cleaning a house,
cooking, running a Little League team, operating an office, processing a
check through a bank, operating an automobile or an airplane, skiing,
and caring for a horse all require expertise. Someone who engages in
any of these activities may have specialized knowledge that, under pro-
per circumstances, could assist the trier of fact in determining a fact in
issue.
What consequences flow from these considerations? In the first
place, no bright line now separates a lay witness from an expert on the
basis of academic degrees, scholarship, or professional status. The scope
of expert testimony has been so expanded that many people, formerly
thought of as lay witnesses, now can be qualified as experts and can ex-
press an opinion even though it is not based on matters directly perceiv-
ed. Indeed, even the opinion of a lay witness need not be based upon the
particular events at issue, but only upon matters perceived by the
witness. Thus, an experienced lay witness can testify, for example, to his
opinion as to the likelihood of harm for using a particular procedure with
which he was personally familiar. 6 A trial lawyer should not overlook
these expanded potentials for opinion testimony.
Rule 702 offers an additional opportunity for expert testimony by
permitting the expert witness to testify in the form of an opinion "or
otherwise." As the advisory committee noted, the assumption that ex-
perts testify only in the form of opinions is logically unfounded." The ad-
visory committee phrased Rule 702 to permit the expert to "give a
dissertation or exposition of scientific or other principles relevant to the
case, leaving the trier of fact to apply them to the facts."1 8 Here. again,
the advocate has an opportunity to shape the jury's thinking about the
problems of the case. Frequently, a solution follows more from asking
the right question rather than from finding the correct answer, and us-
"6 E.g., Farner v. Paccar, Inc., 562 F.2d 518, 529 (8th Cir. 1977) (lay witness in trucking
business for 30 years permitted to give opinion on proper design of suspension system for
trucks under either Rule 701 or 702). But see Randolph v. Collectramatic, Inc., 590 F.2d 844,
848 (10th Cir. 1979) (restaurant owner not permitted to give opinion on safety of pressure
cooker).
11 Notes of Advisory Committee on Proposed Rules, reprinted in FED. R. Evm., Rule
702, 28 U.S.C. Appendix 570 (1976).
Is Id.
19821
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ing an expert to present the principle or theory underlying the key issue
in the case can be a most effective means of persuasion. Education of the
trier of fact by an expert may prove invaluable, whether or not the ex-
pert takes the further step of suggesting to the jury the critical infer-
ence, opinion, or conclusion.
Another consequence arises out of the second sentence of Rule 703,
which permits an expert to base an opinion upon facts or data that are
not admissible in evidence, provided that the facts or data are "of a type
reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opi-
nions or inferences upon the subject." The full impact of this broadening
of the permissible bases for expert opinions has yet to be felt. The rule,
of course, permits an expert to rely upon the literature, studies, tests,
experiments, and other hearsay matters that form the basis for nearly
every recognized area of expertise. It goes further, however, in permit-
ting, for example, a physician to give a diagnosis or prognosis based on a
variety of sources, including statements by patients and relatives;
reports and opinions from nurses, technicians, and other doctors;
hospital records; and x-rays. Such information is generally reliable; in-
deed, physicians routinely rely upon that information in making deci-
sions. While most of the underlying material would in any event be ad-
missible in evidence, the rule obviates the need for calling many
witnesses and authenticating the documents. Pretrial discovery and
preparation can reveal any deficiencies in the underlying data, and
cross-examination can expose the weaknesses in the physician's analysis.
A more difficult problem is presented when the trial court makes an
initial determination that the underlying basis for the proposed expert's
opinion is inadmissible. Such a situation was faced by the court in Zenith
Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co.,19 a multi-district anti-
trust case of mammoth proportions." There, the court ruled that inad-
missible hearsay and other unreliable evidence so permeated the mater-
ials relied upon by plaintiffs' experts in formulating their opinions that
the opinions themselves were inadmissible. Discussing one expert's opi-
nion, the court noted: "What [the expert] has in essence done is to ex-
amine the myriad documents supplied to him by plaintiffs' counsel, to
quote liberally from those documents, and to conclude, 'Aha! Cartel! Con-
spiracy! Illegal concerted action!'"21
Chief Judge Weinstein disagrees with what he terms the restrictive
19 505 F. Supp. 1313 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
The series of orders entered by the Zenith court following a lengthy pretrial eviden-
tiary hearing consumes nearly 300 pages in the Federal Supplement. Id.; 505 F. Supp. 1190
(E.D. Pa. 1980); 505 F. Supp. 1125 (E.D. Pa. 1980). The court noted that plaintiff's pretrial
statement totaled 17,000 pages and that over 250,000 documents had been produced. 505 F.
Supp. at 1137 & n.4.
21 505 F. Supp. at 1349.
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approach taken in Zenith and similar cases 2 because it tends to under-
mine the second sentence of Rule 703, which conditions admissibility
upon the reasonableness of the materials relied upon by the expert, not
upon the admissibility of underlying data itself.3 Rule 703 implicitly in-
corporates a hearsay exception permitting the expert to base an opinion
on inadmissible hearsay, provided that the hearsay is reasonably relied
upon by experts in the field. What the court determined to decide in
Zenith was whether the particular antitrust area lent itself to expert
reliance on hearsay. Alternative grounds for reaching the same result in
Zenith are provided by Rule 403, which permits exclusion of testimony
in the interests of efficiency, a fact recognized by both Chief Judge
Weinstein and the trial judge in Zenith.24 The use of Rule 403 does not
restrict Rule 703's liberal approach, but the Zenith approach adds an un-
necessary and undesirable requirement to Rule 703.
C. Rule 704
Rule 704 provides that an opinion that is otherwise admissible is not
objectionable simply because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided
by the trier of fact.2 Many courts previously excluded testimony which
related to "an ultimate issue" or "usurped the function of the jury."2
The philosophy of the Federal Rules is to permit the witness to give
such testimony and to leave it to the jury to evaluate the opinion in the
light of cross-examination and the other evidence. Frequently, the dif-
ference is merely one of form, because it is often impossible to determine
what is "an ultimate fact." The rules go beyond the purely formal
distinction, however, and permit opinion testimony on any issue of fact.
For example, counsel may now even prove the character of a defen-
dant or of any witness by opinion as well as by reputation evidenceY
Opinion testimony is more natural and generally more believable than
the stilted form of "reputation in the community," particularly when the
witness is given an opportunity to explain the basis for her opinion.
However, in my experience, few attorneys take advantage of this added
opportunity for persuasion.
Opinion testimony that involves mixed questions of fact and law
" E.g., Berguido v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 317 F.2d 628, 631-32 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
375 U.S. 895 (1963).
' 3 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 5, 703[03].
2 See id. 703[031, at 703-21; 505 F. Supp. at 1326 n.12.
FED. R. EVID. 704, Opinion on Ultimate Issue, provides:
Testimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not ob-
jectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of
fact.
" See 7 WIGMORE, supra note 5, § 1920; 3 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 5, 704[01];
MCCORMICK, supra note 5, § 12.
FED. R. EvID. 405; see FED. R. EvID. 608 (placing limitations on FED. R. EvID. 405).
1982]
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presents additional problems. Generally, an opinion by a witness about
the law is excluded because it is superfluous, in light of the judge's
presumed special knowledge of the law." In other circumstances,
however, where facts must be applied in the light of a fairly well
established legal standard, the witness has been permitted to give her
opinion.2"
D. Rule 705
Rule 705 is directed at the form of an expert's testimony." Before
the Federal Rules, most courts required experts to respond to a hypo-
thetical question, an artificial device that caused confusion, delay, and
frustration."1 Under Rule 705, the hypothetical question may be avoided;
all that is required is that the expert first be qualified and then state her
opinion. Nothing even requires her to give on direct examination the
reasons for her opinion, let alone the underlying facts or data.2 Of
course,.a jury may not give much credence to an unsupported opinion, so
if the proponent of the testimony fails to have the expert give her
reasons for the opinion or its underlying facts, counsel on cross-
examination may for tactical reasons choose to ask no questions at all or
she may choose to develop only those facts and ideas that run counter to
the opinion.
This marked change in the form of expert testimony is a welcome
development in trial practice, but it places additional burdens on adver-
sary counsel. In order to determine how to attack an expert's opinion,
and whether to explore the reasoning behind it or the facts underlying
the opinion, the opposing attorney in a civil case must learn all of that in-
formation in advance. For Rule 705 to operate fairly, therefore, exten-
sive pretrial discovery of experts is essential.3
' See Marx & Co., Inc. v. Diners' Club, Inc., 550 F.2d 505, 508-10 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 861 (1977).
See 3 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 5, 704[02].
o FED. R. EvID. 705, Disclosure of Facts or Data Underlying Expert Opinion, provides:
The expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference and give his reasons
therefor without prior disclosure of the underlying facts or data, unless the court
requires otherwise. The expert may in any event be required to disclose the
underlying facts or data on cross-examination.
"' See Notes of Advisory Committee on Proposed Rules, reprinted in FED. R. Evm.
Rule 705, 28 U.S.C. Appendix 571-72 (1976); Ladd, Expert Testimony, 5 VAND. L. REv. 414,
427 (1952). See also 3 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 5, 705[01].
32 The court may, however, require prior disclosure of the underlying facts or data.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4) contemplates extensive pretrial discovery of experts. FED. R.
Civ. P. 26(b)(4) authorizes interrogatories which require an adversary to identify experts,
state the subject matter on which each is expected to testify, and state the substance of the
facts and opinions to which the expert is expected to testify along with a summary of the
grounds for each opinion. See note 42 infra. Given the ingenuity of attorneys who strive to
draft answers that reveal as little information as possible, interrogatories in practice fall far
short of providing adequate discovery of experts. The rule goes further, however, and, on
motion, the court may order further discovery by other means subject to restrictions and




Although not part of Article VII, Rule 803(18) relating to "learned
treatises" not only opens the door to an additional form of opinion
evidence, but also is closely related to the use of expert opinion." In a
"learned treatise" an attorney frequently finds an inexpensive source of
opinion evidence which proves helpful to the jury or effectively rebuts
or corroborates a testifying expert. While the title of subdivision 18 of
Rule 803 is "Learned Treatises," the material which may be read to the
jury under the rule is described in the text of the rule in much broader
language. It includes "statements contained in published treatises,
periodicals or pamphlets on a subject of history, medicine or other
science or art." In appropriate cases, counsel may effectively and per-
suasively use learned treatises.
There are two preconditions to use of a statement from a learned
treatise. First, the treatise must be established as a reliable authority. It
may be qualified "by the testimony or admission of the witness or by
other expert testimony or by judicial notice." Presumably, counsel also
may establish the reliability of a statement in a treatise before trial by
serving her adversary with a notice to admit. 5 If the attorney denies the
truth of the matters sought to be admitted, the denial may be a basis for
recovering the costs of calling an expert solely to establish the state-.
ment as a reliable authority." As the second precondition to use of a
"learned treatise," counsel must call the statement to the attention of an
expert witness upon cross-examination, or the witness must rely on it in
direct examination. As a practical matter, if a friendly expert uses the
statement, she will testify about it in her direct examination. If it is to be
used in connection with an unfriendly expert, counsel will probably have
to establish the statement's reliability independently.' Once reliability
is established, the cross-examiner need only call the statement to the ex-
pert's attention and then read the favorable statement to the jury.' By
" FED. R. EviD. 803 exempts certain items from exclusion by the hearsay rule. Subdivi-
sion (18) provides:
Learned Treatises. To the extent called to the attention of an expert witness upon
cross-examination or relied upon by him in direct examination, statements con-
tained in published treatises, periodicals, or pamphlets on a subject of history,
medicine, or other science or art, established as a reliable authority by the
testimony or admission of the witness or by other expert testimony or by judicial
notice [are not excluded by the hearsay rule]. If admitted, the statements may be
read into evidence but may not be received as exhibits.
See generally Note, Learned Treatises and Rule 803(b)(18) of the Proposed Federal Rules of
Evidence, 5 VAL. U.L. REV. 126 (1970).
FED. R. Civ. P. 36.
FED. R. Civ. P. 37(c).
Every well-coached expert tends to deny the reliability of authorities suggested by
the cross-examiner.
I The attorney may also ask whether the expert agrees with the statement, or
whether she considered it in formulating her opinion, or whether it affects her opinion in
any way.
1982]
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this means, counsel may bring considerable hearsay evidence to the
jury's attention, without cross-examination.
Under the rule, a "learned treatise" may be read to the jury but may
not be received in evidence. It is helpful, however, for counsel to mark
for identification any learned treatises to which she refers. I require that
counsel provide an extra copy of the statement to me so I can mark
whatever parts are actually read to the jury. Not only does a written
copy in the hands of the expert facilitate cross-examination, but written
identification of those portions that have been read to the jury
eliminates any awkward dispute during summation over whether the
particular material has been read during the testimony.
III. Requiring Written Direct Testimony
As noted under Rule 705 above, advance knowledge of opposing ex-
perts' opinions is essential under the Federal Rules' approach. I believe
advance knowledge is so important that in civil cases I require an ex-
pert's direct testimony to be written out, in full, and provided to the
other side well in advance of trial. Whether the testimony is presented
in narrative or in question and answer form is optional with the attor-
ney. In the courtroom, when the expert appears, I read or summarize
her qualifications to the jury, 9 clarify how an expert's testimony differs
from that of an ordinary witness, and explain why her testimony will be
different in form. I further caution the jury not to draw an inference
from the fact that the expert will read the testimony. After the expert
reads her direct testimony to the jury, the opposing attorney cross-
examines her, and any loose ends are then picked up on redirect exami-
nation.
This technique of requiring the expert to write out and then read
her direct testimony, while not unique in the federal courts, is conced-
edly somewhat unusual. In practice, it has pioved to have several advan-
tages. First, it requires both the expert and the attorney to prepare well
in advance of trial. Obviously, by providing complete disclosure of the
testimony, it eliminates surprise. Written direct testimony also reduces
and focuses the need for discovery. As a practical matter, if counsel
defer depositions of the expert until after the expert prepares the
testimony, both experts and attorneys save considerable time and
' The attorney may also have the expert's written qualifications admitted into
evidence so that the jury has access to them during their deliberations. This is a sound tac-
tical move even when the court reads the expert's qualifications, since the trial judge and
the jury often become restless when counsel explores the expert's qualifications at length
on the witness stand. The written resume admitted into evidence thus saves time in the
courtroom since it highlights the expert's qualifications and at the same time gives the jury
an opportunity to explore the qualifications at greater length.
[Vol. XXXIX
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effort.'" As a desirable by-product, the technique discourages develop-
ment of last minute theories for the expert to expound upon.
Secondly, at trial this technique underscores for the jury that an ex-
pert's testimony differs essentially from that of ordinary witnesses. Fur-
thermore, the technique saves considerable time at trial in presenting
the direct testimony, because the expert simply reads her prepared
testimony to the jury after an appropriate explanation from the court
regarding why the expert uses this unusual mode of testimony. More-
over, since opposing counsel knows the exact substance of the
testimony, she generally prepares her cross-examination well and
focuses -precisely on the expert's weak points. Indeed, many times there
is no cross-examination at all."
Admittedly, there are a few disadvantages to this method of handl-
ing experts' testimony. Inevitably the opposing experts seek to adjust
their opinions to match or meet points raised by the other side in their
proposed testimonies. The court can minimize this difficulty, however,
by permitting liberal amendment of the written testimonies after they
are exchanged, provided the amendments are made sufficiently in ad-
vance of trial to avoid surprise. The threat of cross-examination concern-
ing the changes is a substantial deterrent to abuse of the amendment
privilege. Some people fear that after the expert reveals her opinions,
these opinions may persuade or inspire fact witnesses to change their
testimony so as to avoid or undercut certain conclusions of the opposing
expert. The court can easily circumvent this problem bydeferring ex-
change of the expert's testimony until after counsel have had the oppor-
tunity to question the fact witnesses through depositions and inter-
rogatories in order to pin down their versions of the events.
Some attorneys fail to perceive in advance how the dynamics of this
method of presenting expert testimony works in the courtroom. An ex-
pert may read her testimony poorly, either stumbling over words, using
a monotonous tone, or she may generally fail to be convincing. These
problems are not inherent in the technique, however, and most expert
witnesses can readily overcome them with a brief rehearsal.
Another question has been raised as to whether requiring full
disclosure of an expert's opinion conflicts with Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 26(b)(4), 2 which contemplates limited discovery of experts. In my
,' Most attorneys do not resist depositions of their experts or disclosure of the ex-
perts' reports. See Graham, Discovery of Experts Under Rule 26(b)(4) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure: Part Two, An Empirical Study And A Proposal, 1977 U. ILL. L.F. 169,
177.
" In the heat of a trial, one of the most difficult statements for counsel to make is "No
cross-examination." But when counsel has the opportunity to review with her own expert
the opposing expert's direct testimony and to carefully analyze its significance in the
relative calm of the office, a decision to forego cross-examination seems to come more easily.
" FED R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4) provides:
Trial Preparation: Experts. Discovery of facts known and opinions held by ex-
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opinion, no real conflict exists. In the first place, Congress enacted Civil
Procedure Rule 26(b)(4) before the Federal Rules of Evidence greatly
changed the form of opinion testimony, 3 and the liberalized form now
allowed virtually demands more intensive pretrial discovery. Second,
Rule 26(b)(4) itself contemplates "further discovery" if sought by motion;
the rule's goal is not altered simply because the court, on its own motion,
orders disclosure." Third, the extra burden placed on the expert by
preparing written direct testimony is not so great as to require the
extra compensation that might be appropriate if counsel subjected her
to a deposition.45 Finally, Rule 26(b)(4), as well as all other rules, seeks to
obtain a "just, speedy and inexpensive determination,"4 a standard that
can be satisfied at trial under the Federal Rules of Evidence only by
thorough and complete pretrial disclosure of experts' opinions.
Requiring written direct testimony of experts raises still another
question. Some have questioned whether written direct testimony is in-
admissible hearsay because it constitutes reading at trial an out-of-court
statement offered for its truth.4 ' The answer is that while the definition
of hearsay may fit such testimony in form, the policies against use of
perts, otherwise discoverable under the provisions of subdivision (b)(1) of this rule
and acquired or developed in anticipation of litigation or for trial, may be obtained
only as follows:
(A)(i) A party may through interrogatories require any other party to identify
each person whom the other party expects to call as an expert witness at trial, to
state the subject matter on which the expert is expected to testify, and to state
the substance of the facts and opinions to which the expert is expected to testify
and a summary of the grounds for each opinion. (ii) Upon motion, the court may
order further discovery by other means, subject to such restrictions as to scope
and such provisions, pursuant to subdivision (b}(4}(C) of this rule, concerning fees
and expenses as the court may deem appropriate.
(B) A party may discover facts known or opinions held by an expert who has
been retained or specially employed by another party in anticipation of litigation or
preparation for trial and who is not expected to be called as a witness at trial, only
as provided in Rule 35(b) or upon a showing of exceptional circumstances under
which it is impracticable for the party seeking discovery to obtain facts or opi-
nions on the same subject by other means.
(C) Unless manifest injustice would result, (i) the court shall require that the
party seeking discovery pay the expert a reasonable fee for time speht in respond-
ing to discovery under subdivisions (b}(4}(A)(ii) and (b)(4)(B) of this rule; and (ii) with
respect to discovery obtained under subdivision (b)(4)(A)(ii) of this rule the court
may require, and with respect to discovery obtained under subdivision (b)(4)(B) of
this rule the court shall require, the party seeking discovery to pay the other
party a fair portion of the fees and expenses reasonably incurred by the latter
party in obtaining facts and opinions from the expert.
'1 FED. R. Civ. P. 26 was last amended on March 30, 1970. 28 U.S.C. Appendix 438
(1976). Congress enacted the Federal Rules of Evidence on January 2, 1975. Pub. L. No.
93-595, § 1, 88 Stat. 1926 (1975).
" FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(A)(ii); see note 42 supra.
'5 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(C); see note 42 supra.
" FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
'7 FED. R. EVID. 801(c).
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hearsay are not intended to prevent the "freezing" of an expert's
testimony in advance of trial. Several rationales could circumvent the
hearsay objection. The court may classify the testimony not as a state-
ment made out of court, but merely as one prepared out of court for
presentation in court. Alternatively, the court could view the prepared
direct testimony as part of a deposition whose cross-examination was
reserved for trial and whose use at trial was warranted as a "special cir-
cumstance" because the witness is an expert. Finally, on a more
technical level, the court could admit the prepared testimony under
Rule 803(24), the catch-all exception to the hearsay rule.48
For nearly five years I have required this technique for presenting
experts' testimony. Before they actually use the technique, attorneys
generally exhibit negative reactions. After trial, however, many have
enthusiastically praised the method, because it forced their expert to
prepare early, and because it also prodded the attorney to a better, more
intensive analysis of the problems of her case. Finally, the time saved in
developing the expert's testimony at trial, while of little significance to
the attorney, is of great concern to the court and the general administra-
tion of justice.
IV. Attorney's Perspective
An attorney practicing under Article VII of the Federal Rules must
weigh many questions in dealing with opinion testimony. Of the many
possible experts available, which ones should I use? Should I get an
academic type who is strong on theory and book learning, or should I use
a practical expert who has extensive experience with the process or
device at issue? Should I use an expert at all, or should I use opinions of
lay witnesses who have perceived either the events in issue or cir-
cumstances identical to those in issue? How should I frame questions to
help the jury better understand the case? If the opposing expert fails to
explain her opinion, do I ask her to explain her reasoning or to describe
the factors, facts, or data upon which she relies? If on direct examination
the expert explained her opinion in part, do I ask her on cross-
examination about other facts or factors and how she would evaluate
them? What exhibits should I use to illustrate the expert's testimony?
How do I handle the conflicting experts' views in summation?.
Attorneys must resolve all of these practical questions with two ob-
jectives in mind: admissibility and persuasion. In presenting her own ex-
pert, the attorney must, of course, be sure that the testimony is legally
admissible. The attorney must present the necessary foundation of
qualifications and must ensure that the expert's opinions are relevant
and relate to questions of fact rather than law. Remember that admissi-
1s FED. R. Evm. 803(24).
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bility is determined by the trial court, whose discretion is rarely overrul-
ed.49 Since expert testimony may require difficult judgments, a pretrial
conference provides an ideal time to explore the trial judge's views
about the experts and the admissibility of their testimony. A formal mo-
tion in limine may determine in advance of trial the admissibility of a
doubtful opinion. In general, however, given the significantly relaxed
standards established by Article VII, legal admissibility of opinion
testimony is a hurdle relatively easily cleared.
Different types of cases present different opportunities for use of ex-
pert opinion testimony to persuade the fact-finder. For example, in
United States v. Johnson," the government sought to establish that cer-
tain marijuana had been grown in Columbia. Authorities never seized
the marijuana, but the government witness had examined the marijuana
at issue and offered his opinion that it was Columbian-grown.5 Out of the
jury's presence, the prosecutor established that the witness had smoked
marijuana more than a thousand times, "dealt" in marijuana twenty
times, and had identified types of marijuana over one hundred times.2
The witness explained that he based his identification of marijuana on
its appearance, smell, taste, and effect. 3 Satisfied, the trial court found
the witness to be qualified as an expert based on his "experience of be-
ing around a great deal and smoking" marijuana.' Defendant attempted
to rebut the testimony by offering an academic expert who testified to
the lack of scientific proof that Columbian marijuana differed from mari-
juana grown in the United States. The jury, however, rejected the pro-
fessor's "proof' and apparently believed the pot-smoker's "expert"
testimony that the marijuana was not grown in the United States. The
resulting conviction was ultimately upheld on appeal.
This simple illustration suggests that the advocate must assess
carefully the likely impact of different types of expert testimony on the.
jury. By far the most important consideration in preparing and present-
ing opinion testimony is its persuasiveness. The attorney must always
seek the most effective means of getting the point across to the jury.
Well prepared and presented expert testimony provides an invaluable
aid to this end.
"' See text accompanying note 1 supra.
50 575 F.2d 1347 (5th Cir. 1978), cert denied, 440 U.S. 907 (1979).





The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals actually affirmed in part, reversed and remanded
in part, and vacated in part the decision of the trial judge. See id. at 1367. The Fifth Circuit
found that the trial court acted within its discretion in allowing the pot-smoker to testify
that the marijuana was grown in Columbia. Id. at 1360-62. None of the grounds for reversal
is relevant to the points discussed in this article.
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Many of the problems discussed above disappear when considered in
light of the need for persuasion in an adversary trial system. For exam-
ple, no advocate would present an expert, qualify her, ask for her opi-
nion, and then sit down without asking her to explain either her reason-
ing or the facts which support it. To any thinking mind, an opinion is
only as good as the reasoning and premises behind it. No attorney should
present unsupported, and therefore unpersuasive, opinion evidence at
trial.
Despite the welcome demise of the unbending requirement for the
hypothetical question,7 the device should not be totally ignored. In some
cases, the hypothetical question affords an opportunity for a mid-trial
"summation." The attorney can summarize all of the evidence necessary
for the fact-finder to reach the desired verdict and then ask the expert to
state her opinion based on that evidence. The hypothetical question
serves, therefore, as a road map or diagram of the case to remind the
jury of the case's essential fact elements.
To be persuasive, an advocate must know her ultimate objective.
This requires careful preparation of an attorney's own expert, and also
requires careful consideration and rebuttal of the opposing expert's
views. Effective cross-examination demands advance knowledge of the
expert's testimony. An attorney should employ all possible discovery
techniques to ascertain not only the opinion but also its foundations.
With that information, the attorney can construct a factual foundation to
undercut the opinion and also carefully prepare questions that highlight
any weaknesses in the expert's presentation.
Even with lay opinions, counsel can expose weaknesses on cross-
examination by directing attention to conflicting facts or illogical infer-
ences. Given the philosophy of the Federal Rules to present as much
relevant evidence as is consistent with a fair and economical trial, the
advocate should focus her attention on those matters designed to per-
suade the trier of fact on the merits. Formal, technical objections to an
expert's testimony tend to reduce the objecting side's credibility if the
trier is a jury. Therefore, counsel should either ignore technical objec-
tions or raise them in advance out of the jury's presence.
V. Judge's Perspective
Article VII's liberal approach to opinion testimony implicitly im-
poses duties on the trial judge. The Federal Rules provide that courts
should admit relevant opinion evidence but that the counter-
considerations of Rule 403 must be carefully weighed. In this area, a
special burden rests on a trial judge because her determinations are
rarely upset on appeal.' If a fair trial is to be achieved through, or
See text accompanying notes 30-33 supra.
See text accompanying note 1 supra.
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perhaps despite, opinion evidence, it will be done only through the judg-
ment and assistance of the trial court.
Courts have expressed different views of the means through which
the goal of a fair trial ought to be accomplished. Many evidentiary rul-
ings reflect a court's underlying attitude toward juries. For example, the
judge who is confident of the jury's ability to sift through and evaluate
opinion evidence is more apt to admit opinion testimony based on what
some might view as a questionable technique. The judge who is less con-
vinced of the jury's critical abilities may impose a higher threshold of
reliability before admitting an expert opinion in a novel area.
In United States v. Williams,59 the Second Circuit upheld the admis-
sibility of spectographic voice identification evidence, finding that the
technique was "not so inherently unreliable or misleading as to require
its exclusion from the jury's consideration.""0 In United States v.
Brown,61 however, the Sixth Circuit found reversible error in the admis-
sion of hair-matching evidence through a process known as ion micro-
probic analysis. While the cases may be distinguishable on their facts,
implicit in each court's analysis is its view of the jury's proper role. The
court in Brown feared that evidence of a novel technique "may tend to
confuse or mislead the trier of fact and thus defeat a defendant's right to
a fair trial:"62
A courtroom is not a research laboratory. The fate of a defen-
dant in a criminal prosecution should not hang on his ability to
successfully rebut scientific evidence which bears an "aura of
special reliability and trustworthiness," although, in reality the
witness is testifying on the basis of an unproved hypothesis in an
isolated experiment which has yet to gain general acceptance in
its field."
This "general acceptance in the field" criterion stems from Frye v.
United States4 and has been the subject of criticism both before and
after adoption of the Federal Rules. 5 Although courts apparently aban-
doned this requirement in favor of Rule 702's "assist the trier of fact"
standard (limited only by Rule 403), and despite commentators' general
disapproval of the Frye test, Brown illustrates the tenacity of the
"tgeneral acceptance in the field" standard.
' 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir. 1978), cert denied, 439 U.S. 1117 (1979).
583 F.2d at 1200.
557 F.2d 541 (6th Cir. 1977).
'= 557 F.2d at 556 (citations omitted).
63 Id.
293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
See, e.g., MCCORMICK, supra note 5, § 170; 3 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 5,
702[03]. See generally Note, Expert Testimony Based on Novel Scientific Techniques: Ad-
missibility Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 48 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 774 (1980).
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In contrast to the Sixth Circuit's decision in Brown, the Second Cir-
cuit opinion in Williams displays a greater confidence in juries:
It bears reiteration that admissibility alone is under considera-
tion. The jury remains at liberty to reject voice analysis evi-
dence for any of a number of reasons, including a view that the
spectrographic voice analysis technique itself is either unreliable
or misleading.6
This more liberal approach toward admissibility of novel scientific
evidence is consistent with Article VII generally. -
While the trial judge's own view of a jury's ability inevitably in-
fluences her determination of whether a novel technique passes the
threshold of reliability, the court's role in ensuring that expert
testimony is fairly presented extends even further. Because so much of
the attorney's approach to opinion testimony depends upon pretrial
discovery, the trial judge should liberally grant motions under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(4) for discovery by means other than inter-
rogatories.7 Pretrial discussion of the opinions with counsel may help
them to focus their experts' testimony and perhaps eliminate aspects
which provide little help in deciding the case. When dealing with lay opi-
nions at trial, the trial judge can helpfully remind the jury of the dif-
ference between facts actually observed and opinions based on facts
assumed to be true. The trial judge may further caution the jury to
weigh the witness' opinion in the light of the witness' own testimony and
the testimony of the other witnesses. Similar cautions at the time the
court receives expert opinion can help juries deal with the complex sub-
jects addressed by experts. Since cross-examination is very valuable in
testing the soundness of an expert's opinion, and since an attorney is
unlikely to lead an expert witness astray, the court should permit the at-
torney to employ a relatively free-wheeling examination that forces the
expert to defend her opinion.
Special problems with expert testimony arise in criminal cases. Con-
gress designed Rule 705 to eliminate or at least reduce the need for
hypothetical questions. In civil cases, where discovery is extensive, the
risk of unfairness that could arise out of an expert's abbreviated
testimony is minimized. In a criminal case, however, discovery is greatly
restricted. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 entitles a defendant to
discover her own statements, certain documents and tangible objects in
the government's possession, and any reports of examinations and tests
in the government's possession or control." A defendant must turn over
the results of any independent examination or test report only if the
583 F.2d at 1200.
See note 42 supra.
M FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(A),(C),(D).
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government previously turned over reports to the defendant and the
defendant intends to offer either the reports or the witness who
prepared the reports at trial. 9
Since only the reports of experts need be disclosed in a criminal
case, many attorneys try to protect their experts from pretrial dis-
covery by discouraging them from preparing a "report." In practical ef-
fect, many criminal cases operate not far from the "trial by ambush" pat-
tern familiar in civil cases years ago. It is not surprising, therefore, that
crimilal trials require a more antiquated form of handling expert
witnesses. To effectively cross-examine a surprise expert witness in a
criminal case, the attorney needs to know in advance not only the opi-
nion, but also its logic and factual foundations. To provide that
knowledge, the trial court should consider exercising the discretion
granted under Rule 705 and requiring the expert on direct to disclose
the facts or data that underlie her opinion." The court should then re-
quire the expert to give the reasons for her opinion. Opposing counsel
can then better assess whether and how to cross-examine.
Potential problems also arise in criminal cases under Rule 703, which
permits experts to base their opinions on facts or data that are not ad-
missible in evidence." For example, when the government presents an
opinion based on hearsay statements, constitutional problems may arise
under the confrontation clause.72 In addition, a defendant may present an
expert who, after being qualified, gives an opinion favoring defendant on
one of the essential elements of the crime, without explaining her
reasons. On cross-examination, it turns out that the opinion rests in part
on communications that are privileged, either under the attorney-client
privilege or the fifth amendment. Unless the court finds a waiver of the
privilege, the government's only remedy is a motion to strike," which at
best has doubtful efficacy. Fairness to the government, therefore, re-
quires that counsel carefully explore the issue before the witness ex-
presses her opinion to the jury.
Indigent criminal defendants present special problems. If the
government intends to offer scientific evidence, the indigent defendant
probably lacks the resources needed to understand or even to discover
the basis for the opinion in order to prepare a challenge to the govern-
ment's expert. Rule 706, which permits the court to appoint a neutral ex-
pert on its own motion, can alleviate the problem in some instances. Ad-
ditionally, the Criminal Justice Act provides for payment of "other ser-
vices necessary for an adequate defense." The court should construe
" FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(1)(B).
o See note 30 supra.
71 See text accompanying notes 14 and 19-24 supra.
r See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
At this point it remains unclear whether an opinion would necessarily be inadmis-




these provisions liberally, to guarantee the indigent defendant a fair and
impartial trial and a meaningful opportunity to confront the govern-
ment's expert witnesses.
VI. Conclusion
Article VII of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which is a practical,
realistic, and sensible approach to handling opinion evidence in the
courtroom, grants wide discretion to the trial judge. How she exercises
that discretion will reflect her general attitude toward juries and their
ability to deal with issues presented generally, and with opinion
evidence particularly. The greater a judge's trust in juries, the more
relaxed and more permissive will be her application of rules restricting
admissibility of opinion testimony. Conversely, a judge who lacks con-
fidence in a jury's ability to distinguish a weak or fallacious argument
from a sound and persuasive one will tend to impose more stringent re-
quirements on opinion testimony, will more severely restrict the
witness' manner of testifying, and will more freely grant motions to
strike, all in an effort to control the flow of information upon which the
jury may rest its final determination.
Article VII reflects the general philosophy of the Federal Rules,
which favor admissibility of relevant evidence and leave attorneys to
test the weight and persuasiveness of the evidence by free-wheeling
cross-examination and effective summation. The opinion rules place
much reliance, then, on the attorney and her abilities as an advocate. In
the vast majority of cases, the natural dynamics of the adversary system
operate effectively to determine truth and to produce fair, just, and sen-
sible decisions.
' 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e)(1). See also 3 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 5, 706[01].
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